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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Cargile appeals in three cases. She appeals from the judgment entered in
Case No. 38855 upon her conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, specifically challenging the denial of her motion to suppress. In Case
No. 38867 Cargile appeals from the order imposing sentence upon revocation of
probation contending the district court abused its discretion in executing
sentence. Finally, Cargile appeals from the judgment entered upon her plea to
escape in Case No. 38868, asserting the sentence imposed was excessive.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Cargile was arrested and the state charged her with possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver following a traffic stop and dog search
which yielded 20.3 grams of methamphetamine. (PSI, p.2; 38855 R., pp.34-35.)
Cargile filed a motion to suppress what she termed an illegal extension of the
traffic stop. (38855 R., pp.53-62.) Following a hearing, the motion to suppress
was denied.

(38855 R., pp.101-102.) The motion to suppress was originally

denied because the court found Cargile had consented to the search as a
condition of felony probation and the "officer had reasonable articulable facts to
expand the traffic stop beyond a traffic violation." (38855 R., p.146.) The district
court thereafter concluded the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Turek,
Docket No. 36596, 2011 Opinion No. 8, March 2, 2011, "effectively reversed [the
district court's] decision that defendant had consented to the search." (lit) As
such, the district court issued a written order denying Cargile's motion to
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suppress on the alternative bases that the stop was expanded by Cargile's
unlawful refusal to exit her vehicle and that her arrest for obstructing an officer
made the discovery of the contraband inevitable. (38855, R., pp.146-151.)
Cargile entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with intent,
reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress and the matter
was set for sentencing.

(38855 R., pp.123-124; 11/4/10 Tr., p.3, L.20 - p.10,

L.?1.)
Cargile was on probation for possession of a controlled substance at the
time she committed the new offense of possession with intent to deliver and
subsequently admitted to probation violations in that case. (11/8/10 Tr., pp.4-18.)
The district court set disposition in that matter for the day after her sentencing in
the new possession with intent to deliver case.

(11/08/10 Tr., p.19, Ls.2-13.)

Cargile remained in custody in both cases but was granted a brief, one-day
furlough to attend to property issues outside of the jail. (38855 R., pp.128-129.)
Cargile failed to return to jail after her furlough and instead traveled out of state
but was ultimately arrested on warrants in northern Idaho. (PSI, pp.10-11.) The
state then charged her with escape. (38868 R., pp.20-21.)
The court sentenced Cargile to four years fixed followed by nine years
indeterminate for possession with intent to deliver. (38855 R., pp.158-162.) The
district court revoked Cargile's probation and imposed her underlying sentence of
one year followed by four years indeterminate in the probation case. (38867 R.,
pp.230-232.) Upon her plea of guilty to escape, the court sentenced Cargile to a

1

Because there were multiple transcripts prepared for this appeal, they will be
cited to by hearing date.

2

period of one year fixed followed by three years indeterminate to be served
consecutively to the possession with intent to deliver sentence. (38868 R., pp.3841.)
Cargile timely appeals. (38855 R., p.163; 38867 R., pp.233-235; 38868
R., pp.43-45.)

3

ISSUES
Cargile states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Cargile's suppression
motion because when Deputy Vogt approached Ms. Cargile's vehicle,
for a second time, and demanded that she exit her vehicle, he had
abandoned the purposes of the traffic stop, thereby unreasonably
extending the stop beyond the original purpose?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Cargile's
probation and executed the underlying sentence of five years, with one
year fixed?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Ms.
Cargile a unified sentence of four, with one year fixed, following her
guilty plea to escape?
(Appellant's brief, p.9.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1. Has Cargile failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress?
2. Has Cargile failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the execution of
her underlying sentence upon the revocation of her probation?
3. Has Cargile failed to show an abuse of discretion in the imposition of one
year fixed followed by three years indeterminate following her plea of
guilty to escape?
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ARGUMENTS
I.
Cargile Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Suppress

A

Introduction
Cargile challenges the denial of her motion to suppress, contending that

"[l]aw enforcement unreasonably extended the traffic stop lawfully [sic] extended
the stop of Ms. Cargile." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Cargile's argument fails. A
review of the applicable law, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing,
and the district court's factual findings and conclusions of law supports the district
court's conclusion that
1) The traffic stop was not expanded before reasons to arrest and
to search were developed; 2) there are specific and articulable
facts of criminal activity, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, to support an intrusion beyond the reasonable
scope of a traffic stop; and 3) the evidence would have been
obtained in any event under the inevitable discovery doctrine[.]
(38855 R., p.150.) The district court correctly denied Cargile's motion to
suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts." State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

The power to assess the

credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
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factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence.

State v.

Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding
That The Reason For The Traffic Stop Was Not Unlawfully Expanded
It is well-settled that the stop of a vehicle constitutes an investigative

detention subject to Fourth Amendment requirements and is "analyzed under the
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968)." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App.
2008) (citations omitted). It is also well-settled that law enforcement may deploy
a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a lawfully stopped vehicle without suspicion of
drug activity so long as doing so does not prolong the detention beyond what is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405 (2005); State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183-84, 125 P.3d 536, 539-40
(Ct. App. 2005); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct.
App. 2000). "There is no rigid time limit for determining when a detention has
lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the
detention and the law enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the
duration of the stop." Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 198 P.3d at 134 (citations
omitted). The court must also consider whether the officer's observations during
the encounter "and events succeeding the stop" gave rise to "legitimate reasons
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for particularized lines of inquiry and further investigation" which justified
expanding the investigation to other possible crimes.

.!fl; see also State v.

Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 2001 ).
Cargile does not challenge the legality of her initial detention; rather, she
contends that the "officers improperly extended their stop beyond the purpose of
issuing a citation for failing to use her turn signal."

(Appellant's brief, p.13.)

Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence presented at the
suppression hearing shows Cargile's argument fails.
The district court, after hearing the evidence presented, concluded on the
record that there was reasonable articulable suspicion to enlarge the traffic stop
based on the training and experience of Officer Vogt combined with his
observations of Cargile.

(10/28/10 Tr., p.114, Ls.10-20.)

In its subsequent

written order2, the district court developed two additional bases for the denial of
Cargile's motion to suppress:

the lack of an expansion of a traffic stop and

inevitable discovery. (38855 R., pp.146-151.)

In its initial ruling, the district court found the search of Cargile's car was
permitted by the officer's reasonable articulable suspicion coupled with her 4th
Amendment waiver. (See, generally. 10/28/10 Tr., pp.107-115.) The district court
found the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Turek "effectively reversed"
its finding "that defendant had consented to the search." (38855 R., p.146.) The
state believes Turek is distinguishable from the facts in this case wherein there
existed an actual 4th Amendment waiver from an active felony probation. (38867
R., pp.81-88, 94-101, 145-148.) In addition, a probation search is justified by
reasonable suspicion regardless of waiver. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112 (2001); State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 487-88, 95 P.3d 635, 638-39
(2004). Thus, the state submits that the district court's initial conclusion this was
a proper probation search was correct.
2

\
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As he testified at the suppression hearing, Officer's Vogt's experience in
detecting drug use and observing individuals involved with drugs and the drug
trade is vast:

A. [Vogt]
As far as training, I have my intermediate certificate
with POST. I've been to numerous narcotic investigative courses to
include an 80-hour DEA investigator's course. I'm also certified
through the DEA, Drug Enforcement Administration, as a
clandestine lab specialist dismantling, identifying meth labs.
Several drug interdiction courses that I've gone through, probably
two or three of those courses, anywhere from a three- to five-day
course and numerous other investigative course [sic].
Q. [attorney for the state] So in addition to your training as a patrol
officer, do you receive additional training for narcotics investigation
and detection?

A.

Yes; I have.

Q.
Does that include learning to recognize signs and symptoms
of narcotic use -

A.

Yes; it is.

Q.

-- in individuals?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You have some unique experience, too, don't you?

A.

Yes.

Tell me about your experience and about how long you've
been in law enforcement total.
Q.

A.
I've been in law enforcement approximately 13 years. Of
that time, prior to starting my action assignment about two years
ago, I was a narcotics detective with the Sheriff's office for
approximately four years.
During that time,
undercover cases where
narcotics under controlled,
it. I've seen it bought both

I, you know, worked in numerous
me, myself, went out and purchased
you know, environment, so I've bought
covering other undercover officers. I've
8

seen the behaviors of people that are there to deliver their
narcotics, and so it's kind of a unique situation where I've bought it
and seen it bought countless times during that time.
Q.

So you play both sides of this ball?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you understand how that particular world works?

A.

Yes; I do.

Q.
Have you ever been with someone that was dealing
controlled substances when they observed law enforcement?

A.

Yes; I have.

Can you describe for me the mannerisms or demeanor that
you've observed through your experience with someone who's
dealing drugs when they see police officers?
Q.

There's numerous times while working in the undercover
capacity where I would be with a person that was there to sell me
drugs in parking lots of stores, K-marts, Shop-Kos [sic], Walmarts
[sic], various places, and it's not uncommon for just, I guess, dumb
luck, for you know, other uninvolved patrol officers, not knowing
what's going on, will sometimes drive through the parking lot, will
sometimes conduct an uninvolved traffic stop near the area, and so
I've been in those vehicles with, either in my vehicle or in their
vehicle, when the person that was selling me the drugs spotted the
police officers, and so I've seen their demeanor change, their
attention change. It's kind of an unnerving, scary moment for me at
that point because I don't what's going on in their mind when they
see the police, so I have seen their body language change, the way
they look, the way they don't look, what they say, what they don't
say. It's just a unique thing to see.
A.

(10/28/10 Tr., p.53, L.16-p.56, L.8.)
As specifically relating to his interaction with Cargile, Officer Vogt
observed the following behavior when he attempted to perform a traffic stop of
her vehicle:
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But the behaviors that I saw with Ms. Cargile were different than
those in my experience than those normal human behaviors when
the police are behind him [sic]. The way she didn't look at me, but
looking at me out of the corner of her eyes, you know, things like
that caught my attention.

It appeared to me she was trying to act like she didn't see me.

Again looking out of the corner of her eye. You can see a little
head movement, you know, but not a full look into the mirror, so I
saw that slight head movement, and again it looked to me like
looking at [sic] the corner of her eye and not yielding to my lights for
probably a good quarter of a mile, which that, you know, seemed
suspicious to me.
(10/28/10 Tr., p.63, L.1 - p.64, L.7.) Officer Vogt also noted once Cargile did
yield to his lights, she pulled into the center lane instead of pulling to the right and
eventually crossed through traffic to park in a marked space in a business
parking lot.

(See, generally, 10/28/10 Tr., p.64, L.23 - p.68, L.22.) Cargile's

demeanor was consistent with Officer Vogt's experience with suspects dealing in
narcotics as she "appeared to be stalling" and was attempting to get the officer
"away from the public's view." (10/28/10 Tr., p.67, L.23 - p.68, L.12.) While
Officer Vogt was running Cargile's registration and checking the status of her
driver's license and record, another officer with a drug dog arrived on scene.
(10/28/10 Tr., p.71, L.3 - p.73, L.2.) Officer Vogt then approached Cargile with
the other officer and asked her to step out of her vehicle to talk to her about the
reason for the traffic stop. (10/28/10 Tr., p. 73, Ls.3-8.)

Cargile refused to get

out of her vehicle, thus lengthening the time of the original stop. (10/28/10 Tr.,
p.73, Ls.9-19.) As testified to at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the time
10

from initiation of the traffic stop to the time when Cargile's own actions caused
the officers to remove her from her vehicle was approximately eight minutes.
(10/28/10 Tr., p.76, L.1 -p.80, L.20.)
Consistent with the testimony, the district court found made the following
findings of fact:
Around 7:30 p.m., June 23, 2011 Ada County Sherriff
Deputy Vogt, an experienced narcotics detective, was patrolling the
area of Five Mile and Overland in Boise, Idaho when he observed
defendant Sandee Cargille [sic] fail to use her turn signal. He then
followed her for about two miles, during which he contacted Deputy
Piccola, a canine handler who is part of his team, for assistance, as
a matter of routine and also because he was becoming suspicious
of Cargille's [sic] behavior, primarily because of the way she looked
at him and the way she didn't look at him. After about two miles
and positioned directly behind Cargille [sic], he activated his red
and blue emergency lights[.] He noticed that she looked out of the
corner of her eye in the driver's side mirror at him. She did not pull
over but continued to drive for about a quarter of a mile, and it
appeared to him that she was acting as though she did not see him.
He saw a little head movement, but not a full look into the mirror. It
looked like she was looking out of the corner of her eye and not
yielding. After a quarter of a mile, he then activated his siren a
couple of times to get her attention. She then looked directly into
the rearview mirror at the officer. Instead of pulling over to the right
hand side of the road, she drove into the center turn lane. Vogt
though that was odd, because in his numerous traffic stops a
person will pull over to the far right hand lane. She then crossed
traffic onto the other side of the road and then pulled into a large
parking lot of a business. Instead of stopping, she continued to
drive very slowly to the rear of the parking lot behind some
buildings. Vogt found all this traffic and parking pattern to be
unusual. Additionally he was becoming concerned about his safety
because of the stop behind buildings and out of public view. After
Cargille [sic] stopped, he approached her and obtained her driver's
information. He returned to his car to run checks and found some
past drug offenses. Within about five minutes of the stop, Deputy
Picolla [sic] arrived with the canine. Vogt brought Picolla [sic] up to
speed. The intent was that while Picolla [sic] ran the canine around
the vehicle, Vogt would finish up the traffic stop. Within eight
minutes of the stop, Vogt returned to Cargille [sic] to tell her about
her turn signal and the reason for the stop. He asked her to step
11

out of the car. She refused, saying it was her right to stay in the
car. He asked several times and she said "no". He then told her he
had a drug dog here and she needed to step out of the truck so he
could safely run the dog and if she refused she would be arrested.
She again said "No." After several times of refusing to exit, Vogt
verbally told her she was under arrest. She then quickly leaned
over and locked the driver's door. The window was still open so
Vogt reached through the open window and controlled Cargille's
[sic] arms behind her back while Picolla [sic] unlocked the
passenger door, reached for Cargille [sic], moving personal items
out of the way and some onto the ground in the process. After
Cargille [sic] was removed, the canine alerted to items on the
ground and in the vehicle. Cargille [sic] was charged with resisting
and obstructing, possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Vogt also testified that had the dog not alerted, an inventory
search of Cargille's [sic] vehicle would have ensued pursuant to
their inventory procedures.
(38855 R., pp.147-148.)
Cargile claims on appeal the officer had abandoned the initial purpose of
the traffic stop when he requested Cargile exit her vehicle. (Appellant's brief,
p16.) This claim is not supported by the law, which allows an officer to order a
driver from a stopped vehicle. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d
301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128,
134 (Ct. App. 2008). When Officer Vogt asked Cargile to exit her vehicle so he
could discuss the reason for the traffic stop, Cargile refused. There is no support
for Cargile's claim that the traffic stop was impermissibly expanded beyond its
original purpose when the officer requested she exit her vehicle to talk about her
failure to use a turn signal.
However, if this Court were to find an expansion of the traffic stop, as the
district court correctly determined upon review of the testimony presented at the
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hearing on the motion to suppress, once Cargile refused the officer's lawful
request that she exit her vehicle, "things changed and the stop reasonably
expanded into resisting and obstructing an officer." (38855 R., p.150.) Cargile's
actions resisting the officers expanded the traffic stop into an arrest for resist and
obstruct.
Additionally, the record supports the district court's finding of an additional
basis permitting expansion of the traffic stop based on the officer's reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity based on his training and experience and
his observations of Cargile prior to her yielding to his lights and siren. (38855 R.,
pp.149-150). "These facts permitted a lawful expansion of the purpose of the
stop because Vogt had specific and articulable facts to warrant further intrusion."
(38855 R., p.150.)
Finally, even if the traffic stop had been improperly expanded, a
subsequent inventory search following a lawful arrest for resisting and
obstructing officers would have yielded the evidence of drug distribution. Such
evidence would have been admissible at trial based on the inevitable discovery
doctrine. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (Under the inevitable
discovery doctrine the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence found by
improper methods if the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the
evidence inevitably would have been found by lawful means.); Stuart v. State,
136 Idaho 490, 496, 36 P.3d 1278, 1284 (2001) (The inevitable discovery
doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule.). Cargile claims on appeal the
state failed to show how the evidence obtained in the search was "untainted,"
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thereby failing to meet its burden and requiring the suppression of the evidence
as "fruit of the illegal police activity." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Cargile ignores,
however, the district court's finding that the state had met this burden at the
hearing on the motion to suppress:
Here, even if the search was illegal, Vogt had probable cause to
arrest Cargille [sic] for resisting and obstructing. Had the drug dog
not alerted, the controlled substance and paraphernalia would have
been discovered pursuant to a valid inventory search.
38855 R., p.150.) Cargile does not challenge this finding on appeal.
The district court's conclusion in this case, that the traffic stop was not
unreasonably expanded beyond the original scope of the traffic stop based on
the officer's observations of Cargile in light of his training and experience, is
supported by substantial evidence and is consistent with the applicable legal
standards.

Cargile has failed to establish otherwise. As such, she has failed to

meet her burden of showing error in the district court's order denying her motion
to suppress.

II.
Cargile Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion By Imposing Her Underlying Sentence After Revoking Her Probation

A.

Introduction
After finding that Cargile violated her probation based on her admissions,

including the commission of new offenses, the district court set Cargile's
disposition for a date subsequent to the sentencing on her new felony charge.
(11/08/10 Tr., pp.9-19.) In the interim, Cargile was granted a brief furlough to
attend to some property issues outside the jail but failed to return to jail, instead
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traveling to Washington and ultimately being recovered in northern Idaho by law
enforcement.

(5/19/11 Tr., p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.25.) When finally before the

court for disposition on the probation violation, the district court revoked Cargile's
probation and ordered her sentence executed.

(5/27/2011 Tr., p.8, Ls.22-23.)

Although Cargile "does not dispute the district court's decision to revoke
probation," it is her position on appeal "that the district court should have sua
sponte reduced her sentence." (Appellant's brief, p.18.)

Cargile's argument fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v.
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378,381,870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)).

C.

Cargile Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Revoking Her Probation
A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on

appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. State v. Lafferty,
125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994).

An abuse of

discretion cannot be found if the district court's decision was consistent with
applicable legal standards, and was reached by an exercise of reason.

kl

"The purpose of probation is rehabilitation." State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 510,
903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). "In deciding whether revocation of probation is
the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether the probation
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is
15

consistent with protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20
P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001).

Any cause satisfactory to the court, which

indicates that probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify revocation.
Wilson, 127 Idaho at 510, 903 P.2d at 99.
Cargile claims the "district court did not give proper weight to her remorse
and desire to change her ways" in failing to reduce her sentence. (Appellant's
brief, p.19.)

The record, however, supports the district court's sentencing

determination and Cargile's position on appeal is contrary to that at the
disposition hearing wherein she requested imposition of her underlying sentence:
"Your Honor, at this time we are just asking the Court to go ahead and impose
her sentence at this time."

(5/27/11 Tr., p.4, Ls.3-5.)

Cargile was "looking

forward to getting treatment in a setting where she has been sentenced to" in her
other case. (5/27/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.2-3.)
Cargile has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the court's
determination to revoke probation and impose her underlying sentence of one
year fixed followed by four years indeterminate with credit for the 499 days
previously served in custody and recommendation that she be considered for
therapeutic community.
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111.
Cargile Has Failed To Establish An Abuse In Sentencing In The Imposition Of
One Year Fixed Followed By Three Years Indeterminate Upon Her Plea Of Guilty
To Escape

A.

Introduction
Cargile asserts that given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of

one year fixed followed by three years indeterminate following her plea of guilty
to the crime of escape is excessive. (Appellant's brief, p.20.) Cargile has failed
to meet her burden in establishing the district court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for a abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).

C.

Cargile Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of sentencing discretion,

the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the
sentence is excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. To establish
that the sentence is excessive, Cargile must demonstrate that reasonable minds
could not conclude the sentence is appropriate to accomplish the sentencing
goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. lg_,_ Idaho
appellate courts presume that the fixed portion of a sentence will be the
defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980
P.2d 552 (1999).
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Cargile argues on appeal that because she apologized to the court at
sentencing and was remorseful and ready to change her ways at her probation
violation disposition hearing, the court abused its discretion. (Appellant's brief,
p.21.) The district court sentenced Cargile to a period of four years fixed
followed by nine years indeterminate for the possession with intent to deliver.
(5/26/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.12-16.) The escape charge at issue in this claim of abuse
of discretion at sentencing arose from Cargile's fleeing the state after obtaining a
brief furlough following her conditional plea of guilty to the drug charge.

The

district court imposed a four year sentence with the first year fixed to be served
consecutively to the possession with intent charge with a recommendation of
placement in the therapeutic community program after considering Cargile's
criminal history and the information before the court. (5/26/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.1219.)

Cargile was on probation for possession of a controlled substance when
she received the possession with intent to deliver charge. (PSI, p.10.) She had
pied guilty to the new charge and admitted probation violations in the old charge
when she failed to return to jail following a furlough and traveled out of state.
(Id.) It was only after she was arrested on outstanding warrants and returned to
court that she was charged with this escape. She apparently justifies her escape
by pointing to her business plan to sell methamphetamine to pay for land she
wanted in Washington. (PSI, p.11.) As the presentence investigator pointed out,
"it is obvious [Cargile] has not changed her pattern of criminal thinking." (Id.)
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Cargile has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in
imposing a sentence of one year fixed followed by three years indeterminate for
escape.
CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
denial of Cargile's motion to suppress. Additionally, the state requests this Court
affirm the revocation of Cargile's probation and the imposition of her original
sentence in her underlying possession of controlled substance charge as well as
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